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Statement of Disclaimer 
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as 
fulfillment of the course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course 
requirements does not imply technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this 
report is done at the risk of the user. These risks may include, but may not be limited to, 
catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of patent or copyright laws. California 
Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot be held liable for any use or 
misuse of the project.  
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Abstract 
This is an analysis of a 1970’s vintage building as it is compared to current building codes and 
standards. The purpose of this document is to assess if the current, as found construction of an 
existing building could achieve the sometimes more restrictive modern building codes. Both a 
prescriptive analysis and a performance-based analysis were completed to verify life-safety 
concerns and criteria as well as construction criteria. The prescriptive analysis compared 
existing, as found construction to current codes and standards while the prescriptive analysis 
used modern fire modeling techniques to see how likely fire scenarios would challenge the 
structure, if at all.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Life Safety Code, RSET, ASET, Performance Based Design, Fire Dynamics 
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Table 1 Facility Area Designations  
Area  Building  Description 
1.  
TA-53-1 
 A Wing, Administrative Offices 
2.   B Wing, Assembly (Auditorium), Lounge, Café, Offices 
3.   C Wing, Offices, Basement Area additional work spaces 
and Mechanical Space(s) 
4.   D Wing, Offices, and Basement Area with additional 
work space and Mechanical Space(s) 
 
Construction 
Building 1 is an approximately 76,600 square foot building that has a fully compliant NFPA® 13 
suppression system and the following construction makeup. Construction on Building 1 was 
completed in 1971.  It consists of cast-in place concrete, concrete tee, concrete block and steel 
joists.  The exterior walls are concrete block with significant (30-40%) insulated spandrel glass 
openings.  Foundation walls, tunnels, and footers are cast-in place concrete.  Floor/ceiling 
assemblies between floors are concrete tee construction.  The roof/ceiling assemblies are steel 
joists covered with (4 inches) lightweight concrete.  If not for the unprotected steel construction, 
the facility would be entirely of fire resistive construction (Type I). 
“A” Wing is two stories, one at grade and one above with a roughly 4’ by 4’ utility tunnel 
running around the perimeter and below grade.  “B” Wing is one story throughout, though the 
Auditorium (B105) has a projector mezzanine; there is also a utility tunnel under “B” Wing.  “C” 
Wing is one story with a full basement below grade.  Access to the basement is through two 
interior stairwells, one exterior stair, two exterior airway (ventilation only), and through a 
connection to the “D” Wing basement.  “D” Wing is similarly a single story with a partial 
basement under the North-South leg.  Access to the “D” Wing basement is through one interior 
stairwell, two exterior airways (ventilation only), a freight elevator and a hoistway, and a 
connection to the “C” Wing basement. 
Fire Areas 
The facility was likely intended to be separated between floors, between “B” and “C” Wings, 
between “C” and “D” Wings and between the inactive chemical labs in “D” wing and the 
balance of the facility.  The door labels installed between “B” and “C” Wing have been painted 
over and the rating is not evident; they are assumed to carry a minimum 45 minute rating based 
on the materials and construction. This is the same configuration for the doors between “C” and 
“D” wing.  The doors between “D” Wing and the area intended to be a chemical laboratory are 
oversized fire doors.  Though not specifically listed, these doors are of a very similar 
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construction to fire doors and are expected to provide some nominal fire resistance.  In general, 
these separations are beneficial – if not required – and should be maintained. 
With the uncertainties and known deficiencies in the fire doors, the facility will be treated as one 
fire area; however, any fire separations provided in the original construction should be 
maintained.  
Egress Evaluation 
The facility’s layout with respect to emergency egress was evaluated with respect to NFPA® 
101, 2012 edition (1).  The evaluation included, but was not limited, to travel distances, common 
paths of travel, dead end travel and passive fire resistance for egress enclosures.  The quantitative 
analysis will include a comparison of compliance codes (e.g. total travel distance: actual and 
required maximum). 
 
Table 2 Occupancy Classification 
Area  Assembly  Business  Industrial  Storage  Special 
Structure 
 Mixed 
Occupancy 
1.  N/A  All  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
2.  Lecture, Café, 
Lounge 
 Incidental 
Office Space 
 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
3.    Offices  N/A  Basement  N/A  N/A 
4.    Offices  N/A  Basement  N/A  N/A 
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Table 3 Occupancy Load 
 
  
Area  Net Square 
Footage 
Occupant 
Load 
 NFPA®  
criteria 
 Actual Load  Comment(s) 
1.  16959 170  100 ft2/person  <100  Offices 
2.  2358 24  100 ft2/person  <12  Offices 
 2202 156  Fixed Seating  N/A  Lecture 
 2875 575  5 ft2/person  <50  Lounge/Reception 
 1364 91  15 ft2/person 
(less 
concentrated) 
 <48  Café, only 48 seats available. 
3.  11988 (1st 
floor) 
11988 
(basement) 
120 
 
120 
 100 ft2/person  <50 
 
<20 
 Offices 
4.  15,008 (1st 
floor) 
8746 
(basement) 
 
151 
 
88 
 100 ft2/person  <50  Offices 
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Table 4 Egress Capacity 
Area  Exit  Capacity (NFPA®  101 Table 7.3.3.1) Stairs Capacity 
Factor .3, 
 Door Capacity Factor .2 
1.  SE 40 inch door (1st) 
East main door (1st) 72 inch 
X 2 
 195 
720 
Total  
Available 
Required 
 
 
 915 
 
170 
2.  East main door 72 inch X 2 
North 34 inch door of 
auditorium 
South 34 inch door of 
auditorium 
Café 72 inch door 
 720 
170 
170 
360 
Total 
Available 
Required 
   1420 
 
846 
3.  West 72 inch door 
Northeast 72 inch doors X 2 
 360 
720 
Total 
Available 
Required 
   1080 
 
240 
4.  West 36 inch door (1st) 
South 72 inch doors (1st) 
North 72 inch door (1st) 
NW 72 inch door (1st) 
NE 72 inch door (1st) 
 180 
720 
360 
360 
360 
Total 
Available 
Required 
   1980 
 
239 
Basement  West 44 inch stair  146 
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Center 40 inch stair 
Exterior 38 inch stair 
North 44 inch stair 
133 
126 
146 
Total 
Available 
Required 
   551 
208 
 
The egress capacity in Table 4 was calculated using the most restrictive component of each 
particular egress system. 
Based on the lay out of the facilities exits and their calculated egress capacity the egress 
components of this facility were found to be acceptable according to NFPA® 101 (1). 
The Doors between wings “B” and “C” and the doors between wings “C” and “D” would be 
acceptable places for horizontal exits and may have originally been designed to be horizontal 
exits, however the institutional history for buildings of this vintage is that rated walls have been 
breached without proper penetration seals. During the walkdown of this building a full inspection 
of these walls was not completed and therefore cannot be verified that these would still qualify as 
horizontal exits. 
Corridors and stairways are not required to have any rating in accordance with NFPA®, 101 
39.3.6. (1) The finish requirements for exits and corridors is Class A or Class B (NFPA® 101 
39.3.3.2.1) (1) with other areas allowed to be Class A, Class B, and Class C (NFPA® 101 
39.3.3.2.2) (1). 
Exit signs are placed as shown in the Occupancy Identification Maps located at the end of this 
report and are located in accordance with NFPA® 101 7.10.1.2.1 (1) 
All aspects of the egress system for this building meet the prescriptive requirements of NFPA® 
101 for Existing Business Occupancy. 
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Table 5 Means of Egress Features 
  Exit Stairs  Travel 
Distance 
 Common 
Path 
 Dead End  Exit Signs  Emergency 
Area  Enclosed 
(Y/N) 
 To Exit 
 
 Of Travel  Corridor 
Length 
 Illuminated 
(Y/N) 
 Lighting 
NFPA®  
101 
Req. 
   300 ft.  
Sprkd. Bld 
 100 ft.  50 ft.     
1.  (2) Stairs 
(1) 
Enclosed 
 <100 ft.  <20 ft.  None  Tritium  Y 
2.  None  <100 ft.  <20 ft.  None  Tritium  Y 
3.  (3) Stairs 
(2) 
Enclosed 
 <150 ft.  75 ft.   36 ft.   Tritium  Y 
4.  (1) 
Enclosed 
Stair 
 <150 ft.  70 ft.   36 ft.   Tritium  Y 
 
Egress evacuation 
The typical occupants of this building are people in good general health with the ability to move 
at an appropriate pace to self-evacuate. The response to a fire will most likely be delayed for the 
following reasons. First, drills and maintenance are performed on the notification system at 
regular intervals and even though prior notification is usually communicated to occupants before 
maintenance begins with an approximate time of completion and a follow-up announcement that 
the test is over. This process lends itself to complacency with regards to immediate response to 
alarms resulting in additional stimulation needed to get people moving. This could be peers 
walking by, the smell of smoke, or someone yelling this is not a drill. 
Secondly, some individuals may be working with sensitive information and feel the need to 
secure it before they attempt to egress. This is not required by procedure but if not done the 
notification process after the event could take a while motivating individuals to secure before 
leaving.   
Thirdly, this building is located in the northern mountains of New Mexico and is susceptible to 
inclement weather resulting in additional delays as people gather their belongings before they 
leave. 
The estimated delay for these pre-movement delays would be in the range of 2 to 3 minutes. 
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Evacuation Time 
Assuming that for a worst case scenario the total allowed occupant load was in the building, and 
that everyone left immediately at the same time during the event and used all exits in balance, an 
approximate egress time could be calculated. Calculating time would be based on the time it 
takes the required number of occupants out the most restrictive exit. 
Total Occupants =1703 
Number of Exits = 14 
1703/14= 122 people per door 
Most restrictive door is a 36 inch door. 
A 36 inch door has 6 inches of boundary layer on each side of the door (NFPA® HB 20th Edition 
Table 4.2.4) (2)leaving and effective width of 2 feet. 
From Table 4.2.8 (NFPA® HB) the Maximum Specific Flow for doors is 24 people/minute/ft. of 
effective width. (2) 
24 X 2 = 48 people per minute through the door 
122/48 = 2.5 minutes total egress time 
When you add in the 3 minutes (worst case) for the pre-movement time you get an egress time of 
5.5 minutes. 
This however is unlikely because you cannot assume that all people will use every exit equally. 
The larger exits can accommodate more people than are usually present during normal operating 
times. The egress times for this building are most likely less than calculated. Occupant loads are 
much less than calculated. 
For tenability of the occupants during a fire event it is realistically not likely for an untenable 
environment to happen that would prevent or block an egress path. This building is fully 
sprinkler protected with nonhazardous uses and a well laid out egress system. The only tenability 
issues would be keeping smoke above 5 feet for a smoldering fire that is not yet hot enough to 
activate the sprinkler system, however this scenario happening without someone being alerted 
quickly is unlikely during normal business hours. 
Findings 
During the walk-down of the facility it was noticed that the North most exit’s external stairs were 
not properly maintained for the recent winter weather and that the steps do not lead to a proper 
public way. NFPA® 101 (2012) (1) 
  
7.1.10.1* General. Means of egress shall be continuously maintained free of all obstructions or 
impediments to full instant use in the case of fire or other emergency. 
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7.7.1* Exit Termination. Exits shall terminate directly, at a public way or at an exterior exit 
discharge, unless otherwise provided in 7.7.1.2 through 7.7.1.4. (1) 
Fire Protection Alarm System Analysis of Technical Area 53 Building 1  
Fire Detection and Alarm System 
 
The fire detection and alarm system in TA-53-1 was updated in 2004/2005.  New manual pull 
stations, smoke detectors, individually addressable modules (IAM), booster power supplies 
(BPS), conduit and conductors were installed.  All devices report to a new Edwards Systems 
Technologies (EST, GE Infrastructure) Model QS4 Fire Control Panel.  This panel activates 
devices on two internally-driven notification appliance circuits (NAC) and two external BPS 
units and their associated notification appliances.  This system also communicates with the fire 
dispatch center through two dedicated phone lines. 
The HVAC controls, elevator controls, and mechanical interface devices (i.e. flow switches, 
tamper switches) were not upgraded or added.  Where such devices previously existed – as in the 
case of water flow detection and valve supervision – the existing devices were connected to new 
IAM that report to the new panel. 
Type of Detectors 
There are two types of detectors located within this building. The first being the fire suppression 
system and the second being some strategically placed smoke detection. 
The primary way of detection for this building would be the NFPA® 13 compliant sprinkler 
system. Each sprinkler contains a sacrificial element that when heated to 212°F will break and 
allow water to be discharged. This discharge of water will activate the suppression system 
pressure switch located at the riser. This switch is constantly monitored by the building fire 
alarm panel and upon receipt of the signal, will initiate the building notification appliances and 
report the condition to a constantly attended location for dispatch of the fire department.  
The second type of detection in this facility is photoelectric area smoke detectors manufactured 
by General Electric, model SIGA-PS. These detectors are placed in the telecommunication room, 
the computer room, and above the FACP. These devices are strategically placed for asset 
protection.  
Compliance with NFPA® 72 
As stated previously the fire suppression system is fully compliant with NFPA® 13. The 
suppression system consists of standard response heads rated for 212°F with a spacing of 12’ X 
12’. 
The smoke detectors are strategically placed for asset protection by way of early warning. The 
telecommunication room is a space of 20’ X 40’ and is protected by two detectors. This 
configuration is compliant with NFPA® 72. In the computer room there are a total of three 
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detectors, one ceiling mount and two under floor mounted. The ceiling mount detector is 
protecting an area of 16’X 30’ while the two underfloor detectors protect the same area. It is 
assumed that the under floor area is used for routing of cabling and cooling plenum for the 
equipment. Without having document history it is assumed the two detectors are required based 
on hazard protection in accordance with NFPA® 72 (2013) 17.7.3.1.3. (3) The last location of a 
smoke detector is above the FACP which is a NFPA® 72 requirement.  
Detector Response 
Fire scenario 1: For this fire scenario there was a stack of collapsed cardboard boxes with some 
other incidental trash found in the basement near the stairs during my walk downs of this 
building. Assuming this fuel package ignites, what would be the response characteristics of the 
suppression system?  
The input parameters for the DETACT model are as follows: 
Ceiling Height = 9’ = 2.7m 
Room Width = 14’ = 4.2m 
Radial distance based on 12X12 spacing = 16.7’ = 5.1 assuming worst case  
Note: The actual location of the head in relation to the fuel package is directly above it.  
20°C ambient 
212°F head = 100°C 
Sprinkler RTI of 100 
“t-squared fire” with a medium growth rate as indicated by Table B.2.3.2.6.2 (a) for item 9 
Note: Stack is only 3 feet tall. 
With these conditions the DETACT model predicts the sprinkler will activate at approximately 
380 seconds with a HRR of approximately 1600kw. This would be under worst case conditions. 
In actuality the sprinkler is located above the fuel package and would most likely have faster 
response. However with these results I think the fire would be adequately suppressed.  
Fire scenario 2:  In this scenario I assume there is an equipment failure in the computer room 
with ignition of computer components. What would be the response characteristics of the smoke 
detector located on the ceiling of that room? 
 The input parameters for the DETACT model for scenario 2 are as follows: Treating the smoke 
detector as a super sensitive heat detector. 
Ceiling Height = 9’ = 2.7m 
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Room Width = 30’ = 9.1m 
Radial distance based on detector in center of room and fire at edge = 34’ = 10.3 assuming worst 
case  
20°C ambient 
Detector activation is based on a rise in temperature of 7.2°C from Table B.4.7.5.3 (NFPA® 72) 
for PVC (3). Assuming the PVC was the closest to the plastics contained in computer equipment.     
No RTI 
“t-squared fire” with a Fast growth rate as indicated by Table B.2.3.2.6.2 (a) (NFPA® 72) for 
item 16 (3) 
The DETACT model shows the detector will activate in 41 seconds with a HRR of 79kw. 
Fire Alarm System 
The fire panel is Edwards Systems Technologies (EST, GE Infrastructure) Model QS4 Fire 
Control Panel.  This panel activates devices on two internally-driven notification appliance 
circuits (NAC) and two external BPS units and their associated notification appliances.  This 
system also communicates with the fire dispatch center through two dedicated phone lines 
through a digital alarm communicator transmitter (DACT). 
All signals are transmitted off the site to a central station and then dispatched accordingly. All 
trouble and supervisory signals are dispatched to on call fire alarm elections to be investigated. 
All alarm signals are dispatched to the county from the central station and they dispatch 
emergency personnel.   
Notification Devices 
The only notification devices are the General Electric Field Configurable Horns and Strobes- 
Genesis Series. These are used both as horns and strobes and as strobe only devices. They are 
field configurable for both horns and strobe candela rating. The strobe ratings are 15cd, 30cd, 
75cd, and 110cd rating. The horns are somewhat configurable in that they have a high output 
level of 99dB at 10 feet and low output level of 94dB. 
Compliance with NFPA® 72  
This building is mostly an office building; most of the notification appliances are located in the 
corridors. The spacing in the corridors is compliant with the corridor strobes being set to 15cd. 
All public (lobbies, restrooms, and conference rooms) areas also have appropriate notification 
devices for the size of their rooms. 
Using the 6dBA rule of thumb the devices under the most demand are located in a mechanical 
room in the basement. 
Room size is 60’ X 60’ 
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The horn produces 99dB at 10 feet so the dB level at 80 feet would be 81dB. 
Requirements for the space are 15dB above ambient back ground noise which for mechanical 
rooms is 85dBA average From Table A.18.4.3. This means you need 100dB in the room. 
The max dB allowed is 110 which is what the devices are set to, therefore sounds levels for this 
room have reached the max. 
Table 18.5.5.4.1 (a) stated a room of this size can be covered by one 135cd strobe or four 30cd 
strobes. 
This area is cover by two 110 cd strobes which is in excess of the code requirement.   
Mass Notification Systems 
This building does not have a mass notification system, however the laboratory as a whole uses 
emergency text message and emergency email notification to notify the population of an 
emergency.  
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Table 6 Battery Calculations 
Number Device Current Total 
 NAC #1 Stand by Total Alarm  
11 HS 15cd    .081 .891 
4 S 15cd     .059 .224 
1 75cd   .152 .152 
NAC #1      1.279 amps 
      
 NAC#2     
9 HS 15cd    .081 .729 
2 S 15cd     .059 .118 
NAC #2     .847 amps 
      
Control Panel       
      
1 Quick-Start 
CPU  
.117 .117 .135 .135 
1 PS6 .072 .072 .096 .096 
1 SLIC controller .033 .033 .057 .057 
1 DACT .013 .013 .026 .026 
Initiating 
Devices 
     
8 Smoke 
Detectors 
.000045 .0004 .000045 .00036 
21  Pull Stations .000396 .0083 .00068 .01428 
10  Single Input 
Module 
.00025 .0025 .0004 .004 
1 Dual Input 
Module 
.000396 .0004 .00068 .00068 
      
Output 
Devices 
     
      
2 Single Channel 
Riser Module 
.000223 .0004 .0001 .0002 
1 Output Relay 
Module 
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
      
NAC #1     1.279 amps 
NAC #2     .847 amps 
      
Total   .2507  2.46 amps 
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Laboratory requires 24 hours of standby power .2507 X 24 hours = 6 AH required 
Laboratory requires 10 minutes of alarm 10/60= .16667 X 2.46= .410 AH required  
   6 + .410 = 6.410 AH (derate by 20%) X 1.2= 7.692 amp hours required. 
This System is supplied by two 12 AH batteries.  
Inspection Testing and Maintenance  
All alarms system components shall be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with 
NFPA® 72 chapter 14.  
At initial acceptance 100% of the alarm system shall be tested and shall work with all 
interconnected building systems. These controls shall function as designed in the design 
documents matrix. 
Where the alarm system interacts with the fire suppressions system, these components shall be 
inspected, tested, and maintained by the requirements and intervals set forth in NFPA® 25 Water 
Based Fire Suppression Systems. 
Fire Protection System Analysis of Technical Area 53 Building 1  
Fire Protection System 
The facility is protected throughout by two distinct automatic fire sprinkler systems with an 
additional wet chemical extinguishing system to protect the cooking equipment in the café.  
System SPW-001 covers Wings “A”, “B”, “C”.  The 6 inch cast-iron fire water supply enters in 
the basement Room C18 where a pressure switch with a retard chamber and attached to an alarm 
check valve detects flow at the riser.  There is also a redundant set of flow switches that divide 
the system by zone (e.g. wing and floor).  System SPW-002 provides coverage to “D” Wing, 
enters Room D3 Room C18 where a pressure switch with a retard chamber and attached to an 
alarm check valve detects flow at the riser.   
The system design density is nominally compliant with the code of record (NFPA® 13, 1980 
Edition); that is, it provides 0.19 gpm/ft2 over 1500 ft2.  The current standard, NFPA® 13, would 
require a slightly higher density (0.20 gpm/ft2) (4). The water supply has changed little through 
the years.   
The fire sprinkler heads are standard spray upright, pendant, and extended coverage sidewall (in 
some offices and laboratories), 212°F, standard response and spaced to cover <130 ft2/head.   
The “D” wing sprinkler system did not have a riser tag with flow data. After further research of 
available sprinkler system drawings it is believed that this portion of the building is protected 
using a pipe schedule system. 
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Spare sprinkler cabinets were observed during the site visit as not having minimum spare 
sprinklers in the cabinets.  These cabinets are required by NFPA® 13 and should be installed 
with no less than 12 heads, one cabinet near each riser with each having no less than 6 spare 
heads would be appropriate (4).  All sprinkler types in the facility should be represented with 
spare stock in such a cabinet (e.g. extended coverage sidewall, standard spray upright and 
pendant, special temperature ratings).  The cabinet would normally be mounted on the wall 
nearest the riser.  A sprinkler wrench should also be provided.  
In Hallway C1, outside of Room C5, there is a duct greater than 48 in. in width with no sprinkler 
coverage beneath.  Sprinkler coverage is required by NFPA® 13 underneath any horizontal 
obstruction that is greater than 48 in. in width (4). 
Table 7 Fire Protection Features Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems
   Suppression System Type  Design  Spacing  System 
Design 
 FD Hose  H2O Testing 
Results 
Area  (Wet/Dry/Preaction/Deluge)  gpm/ft2  ft2/head  BoR 
Req’t. 
 Allowance  Static – Flow – 
Residual 
1, 2, 
3 
 Wet  0.19 
gpm/ft2 
1500 ft2 
 <130 ft2  65 psi @ 
663 gpm 
 250 gpm  75psi (S) 
63 psi @ 
954gpm 
Hyd. 53-8052 
(2012) 
      
      
4.  Wet                 No Design Info On  File        70psi(S) 
                                                                           68psi@915gpm 
                                                                       Hyd. 53-806 (2013) 
            Central Station Supervision of: 
Area  Std 
Response 
 Quick 
Response 
 HD 
Activation 
 UV/IR 
Activation 
 Manual 
Actuation 
 Waterflow  Detection  Valves 
1.  All  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  Pressure 
& Paddle 
by Zone 
 N/A  Yes1 
2.         
3.         
4.  All  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  Pressure 
& Paddle 
 N/A  Yes1 
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by Zone 
1. Control valves are supervised; alarm valves as part of the alarm check valve and retard 
chamber assembly are not supervised as required. 
2. Test date: September 9, 2012 and August 12, 2013 
 
The Hydrant Flow data is provided to us by the Los Alamos County Fire Department. Every 
hydrant is exercised once a year with hydrant flow calculations done every two years on each 
hydrant. The Fire Protection Division Office believes that this hydrant flow date is not accurate 
for new construction or design purposes and therefore only uses this LAFD information as a way 
to check system health. When a new project is in the works FP-DO will conduct a test with 
calibrated equipment at a site nearest the point of connection.  
 
Table 8 Sprinkler Head Location(s) and Type(s) 
Area  Qty.  Manufacturer  Year  Model  Type 
1,2,3  140  Star  1969  Model D  SSU (“C” Wing Basement) 
 30  Reliable  1981  Model G  SSU 
 340  Reliable  1981  Model G  SSP 
 40  Central  1981  HF-17/32  Extended Coverage Sidewall 
(“A” Wing Corridors) 
4.  ~100  Star  1969  Model D  SSU (“D” Wing Basement) 
 ~100  Reliable  1981  Model G  SSP 
Note:  There are some Grinnell F950 sprinkler heads in the facility (circa 1979).  These 
sprinkler heads are prone to unwanted activations, but none of these heads were observed 
near critical electronics equipment. 
 
Calculations 
For this project a hand calculation of the auditorium was completed. The calculation was 
completed using the new NFPA® 13 and DOE requirements which are .2 gpm per square foot 
with an area of 1500 square feet (Ordinary group 2 demands) and a DOE required hose 
allowance of 500gpm. 
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A problem I had with the calculation was finding good drawings of the system. The drawings I 
could find were dated 1981 and had too much information on one sheet. I did my best to 
highlight the system and made my best guess on pipe lengths and elevation changes and fittings. 
The calculation showed a system demand of 341.5gpm at 141.5 psi which is undoubtedly greater 
demand than the system was originally designed and is well above the available supply. The high 
pressures needed as a result of the hand calculation show that my guess on elevation changes, 
pipe lengths, and fittings were most likely wrong, resulting in the inflated pressure demand. 
However the site is provided with a tank and pump configuration that can serve this inflated 
demand. 
Fire Pumps 
The area that Building 1 is located in is protected by two site wide fire pumps. An electric fire 
booster pump, taking suction from the water storage tank, is located in the MPF-54 pump house. 
The fire booster pump is a PATTERSON Pump Model 8X6 MIH, single-stage horizontal fire 
pump (13.281-in impeller diameter), with a pump rating of 1,250 gpm @ 70 net psi at 1780 
RPM. It has a nameplate net pressure of 58 psi @ 150% rated flow (82.3 maximum BHP) when 
driven by an WEG Type DP electric motor rated at 150 HP @ 1785 RPM (460 V, 60 Hz, 3-
phase electric supply at 167 A). The motor has a service factor = 1.15. The electric fire pump is 
activated when the TA-53 water supply system pressure drops below 11 psi. The fire pump is 
either manual or automatic start but only manual shut-off.  
 
A second fire water storage tank with diesel-driven fire booster pump was originally provided for 
TA-53 to improve the TA-53 fire water supply reliability. The tank has a capacity of 750,000-
gal. The pump is a Patterson Pump Model 8X6ML, single-stage horizontal fire pump (13.531-in 
impeller diameter) rated at 1250 gpm @ 70 net psi at 1750 RPM. The pump driver is a Clarke 
Model JU4H-UF58 diesel engine rated at 110 HP @ 1750 RPM, derated to 79 HP @ 1470 RPM 
at 7,300 ft. elevation.  
 
It is recommended that a computer based calculation be ran on the system once better as-builds 
have been found or created. 
Inspection Testing and Maintenance (ITM) 
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Table 9 ITM 
Sprinklers At 50 years and every10 years thereafter 
Shall be inspected for Leakage, Corrosion, 
Physical damage, Loss of fluid in the glass 
bulb heat responsive element, Loading, 
Painting unless painted by the sprinkler 
manufacturer and correct orientation annually 
Control Valves Shall be inspected for proper position In the 
normal open or closed position, Sealed, locked, 
or supervised,  Accessible, Provided with 
correct wrenches, Free from external leaks,  
Provided with applicable identification 
Monthly 
Annually each valve shall be operated 
Piping Obstruction, internal inspection of piping shall 
be done every 5 years 
Piping shall be free of mechanical damage and 
no additional external loads shall be place on 
the piping. Monthly 
Signs Shall be legible to indicate what each valve 
controls.  
The Riser Tag should also be clear and legible.  
 
The previous is just a small sampling of typical ITM activities. For a more complete list of 
requirements you can go NFPA® 25 Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of 
Water-Based Fire Protection Systems. (5) 
Fire Protection Structural Analysis of Technical Area 53 Building 1  
 
Construction 
Building 1 is an approximately 81,000 square foot building that has a fully compliant NFPA® 13 
suppression system and the following construction makeup. Construction on Building 1 was 
completed in 1971.  It consists of cast-in place concrete, concrete tee, concrete block and steel 
joists.  The exterior walls are concrete block with significant (30-40%) insulated spandrel glass 
openings.  Foundation walls, tunnels, and footers are cast-in place concrete.  Floor/ceiling 
assemblies between floors are concrete tee construction.  The roof/ceiling assemblies are steel 
joists covered with (4 inches) lightweight concrete.  If not for the unprotected steel construction, 
the facility would be entirely of fire resistive construction (Type I) with the unprotected steel 
construction in mind Building 1 is of Type II B construction. 
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“A” Wing is two stories, one at grade and one above with a roughly 4’ by 4’ utility tunnel 
running around the perimeter and below grade.  “B” Wing is one story throughout, though the 
Auditorium (B105) has a projector mezzanine; there is also a utility tunnel under “B” Wing.  “C” 
Wing is one story with a full basement below grade.  Access to the basement is through two 
interior stairwells, one exterior stair, two exterior airway (ventilation only), and through a 
connection to the “D” Wing basement.  “D” Wing is similarly a single story with a partial 
basement under the North-South leg.  Access to the “D” Wing basement is through one interior 
stairwell, two exterior airways (ventilation only), a freight elevator and a hoistway, and a 
connection to the “C” Wing basement. 
Occupancy Classification 
 The occupancy of Building 1 is mixed with the majority of the structure being classified as 
business (Group B) and houses mostly office space. Building 1 does have two assembly areas a 
lecture hall classified as an A-3 occupancy with an occupant load of 156 and a small cafeteria 
that would be classified as an A-2 occupancy with an occupant load of 91. Using Table 508.4 
Required Separation of Occupancies (IBC 2012) (6) the required separation between a group B 
and group A for a sprinklered building is 1 hour. 
 
The height of Building 1 is 22 feet above grade with one level below grade (14’) these heights do 
not qualify Building 1 as a high rise building. (6)   
IBC 2012 Construction Requirements 
Using Table 503 Allowable Building Heights and Areas (IBC 2012) (6) to assess the required 
construction of the Group B building. The total area of the building is 81,000 square feet with 
two stories above grade. The first floor has square footage of 47,680 with the second floor 
having a square footage of 10,345 and the basement with a square footage of 23,221. The area of 
the first floor exceeds the allowable limits of all construction types except Type 1 construction, 
which as stated earlier Building 1 is not this type. So a building area modification has to be done 
in accordance with Section 506 of the IBC. (6) 
Aa = {At + [At X If] + [At X Is]} 
 At = 23,000 Type II B 
If = [F/P- .25] W/30 
F= 1321 
P= 1768 
W = 30 the frontage width varies along the perimeter but all widths are over 30 feet. 
If = .5 
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Is = 2 (Section 506.3 IBC states a two story building fully sprinklered gets an increase of 2) 
Aa =23,000 + (23,000 X .5) + (23,000 X 2) = 80,500 > 47,680 feet of the first floor. 
All construction types could be used but Type V B is eliminated based on allowable area. 
Structural Fire Protection Requirements 
Due to the un-protected steel joist in the floor/ceiling assemblies this building is of Type II B 
construction. The requirements for this type of construction can be found in table 601 of the IBC 
(6). Type IIB has no fire resistance ratings that need to be achieved by the IBC. Plus with the 
lack of exposures to Building 1 there are no exterior wall fire resistance ratings that need to be 
applied. 
Code Compliance 
Although Building 1 was built in the 1970s it is my opinion that from a structural stand point it 
still meets 2012 building code and could easily have its construction type upgraded if there were 
ever the need. 
In regards to the 1 hour separation required between the assembly areas and the business areas, it 
is believed that the original construction meets this requirement with the use of cinderblock walls 
and rated doors. However it has been an institutional issue that rated walls like these have often 
been breached as building components have been upgraded or decommissioned. One would have 
to assume this is the case for these rated separations until a proper inspection has been completed 
which is beyond the limits of this analysis.   
Fire Safety Plan for Technical Area 53 Building 1  
Procedure for Reporting Fires and Evacuation of Building 
Reporting Fires 
(From LANL Emergency Procedures and Protective Actions) (7) 
Initial emergency reporting must be made promptly, accurately, and effectively by any on-scene 
observer/worker who is knowledgeable of the event. The worker must call:  
 
▪ 911 for life threatening events such as a person needing medical attention or a fire,  
− Workers should provide a description of the emergency, location, and protective actions taken 
(evacuation/sheltering).  
▪ if applicable, response teams in the facility, and  
▪ line/facility management and/or local Operations Center, where applicable.  
 
Building Evacuation 
(From LANL Emergency Procedures and Protective Actions) 
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The purpose of evacuating a building is to remove oneself from danger such as a chemical spill, 
fire, suspicious package, bomb threat, or other emergency event that is within the building. It is 
important that all LANL workers be familiar with the evacuation procedure and posted 
emergency evacuation diagrams for the building that is their primary place of employment as 
well as other areas that they frequent.  
 
Once a worker has received a notification to take protective actions, under no circumstances 
should he or she return to a hazardous area or building to perform sweeps, make notifications, or 
collect belongings. Building-specific emergency/facility plans may provide additional 
information.  
 
If it is unsafe to go outside (e.g., due to lightning), evacuees will make a safe, secure, and 
responsible decision. The best course of action may be to evacuate to another building, or to 
personal vehicles in the parking lot.  
 
Upon hearing the notification to evacuate, all occupants will evacuate the building immediately, 
if safe to do so, and perform the following with minimal delay:  
 
1. Evacuate the building  
▪ If accessible and safe to do so, take coats, hand bags/briefcases, and car keys in the 
event re-entry to the building is not allowed, or there is inclement weather.  
▪ DO NOT carry food, drinks, or items that, if dropped, could inhibit safe egress and 
cause slips, trips, or falls.  
▪ If the route is blocked by unsafe conditions, take the nearest safe path out of the 
building.  
▪ DO NOT deviate from the exit route to sweep an area.  
▪ DO NOT use the elevator.  
 
2. Sweep while evacuating  
Sweeping is the action of paying attention while evacuating. The steps for sweeping are the 
following:  
▪ Conduct a visual sweep along the route between the work location and the building exit.  
▪ Knock on office doors that are closed or locked, shout loudly to evacuate.  
▪ If safe, open doors and shout “evacuate” in areas such as restrooms, locker rooms, 
conference rooms, etc., or anywhere a facility occupant could be unaware of an 
emergency condition.  
▪ Pay attention to anything that may assist with the timely rescue of personnel or identify 
the source of the emergency event.  
▪ Notify the AAL of any person needing assistance to evacuate.  
 
3. Assemble at the designated Assembly Area (AA) for accountability.  
Accounting for all persons after emergency evacuation is essential. When gathering at the AA, 
workers must:  
▪ Be aware of and give the right-of-way to responding emergency vehicles and personnel.  
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▪ Provide the Assembly Area Leader (AAL), applicable local Operations Center, or IC 
with any information (e.g., smoke, pool of water, person-down, strange odor, hazardous 
conditions) obtained during the sweep.  
▪ Provide information regarding any resident who is absent or missing from the AA to the 
AAL, applicable local Operations Center, or IC.  
▪ Remain at the designated AA for further instructions or until the “All Clear” signal is 
given by the IC or designee.  
▪ NOT re-enter the building until instructed to do so by the AAL or applicable local 
Operations Center (who will be instructed by the IC).  
 
Note: Some emergency events may deteriorate rather than improve. If this is the case, the IC or 
building residents will determine the need to move a population from their initial AA or shelter 
location to a relocation center, or move uphill or upwind of the event. The AAL or applicable 
local Operations Center will report accountability and status of personnel back to the IC.  
 
4. Report the event to the IC or EOC via the AAL, runner, radio, or phone call. The following 
should be conveyed in the report:  
▪ Why evacuated, accountability, and changes in AA  
▪ Observed hazards or unusual conditions  
▪ Any known injuries  
▪ Status of critical equipment/operations  
 
5. Additional information from the IC will be relayed to the AAL such as all clear, etc.  
 
6. Return to normal operations  
 
Returning to normal operations is the point at which the IC turns the facility back over to the 
facility personnel (typically the FOD or designee). Facility personnel must participate in a face-
to-face briefing with the IC to determine if recovery tasks must be completed. The IC or the 
facility personnel will then direct workers to return to the building so operations may resume.  
Workers must not return to the building until they have received the “All Clear” from the IC. The 
IC may provide the facility personnel/AAL the “All Clear” to provide to building residents.  
 
Any worker having a permanent or temporary special need that may hinder his or her evacuation 
must notify his or her line manager. The line manager will assign a co-worker(s) to assist the 
worker during all emergency events including, but not limited to, drills and real events requiring 
evacuation or sheltering.  
Workers assisting others should:  
▪ Always ask someone with a disability how they can be of help before attempting any 
rescue technique or giving assistance.  
▪ Assist special needs individuals out of the building using the nearest exit. 
▪ If unable to exit the building, and if safe to do so, assist the individual to the nearest exit 
stairwell or safe area of refuge, and inform emergency personnel of the situation.  
▪ Notify the AAL/IC.  
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All guests, visitors, and outside personnel (including subcontract and crafts workers, 
maintenance workers, delivery personnel, or persons attending a meeting) conducting business in 
a building are responsible to ask for evacuation information or to follow a resident during an 
evacuation. If an emergency evacuation occurs, building residents should consider escorting 
visitors and ensuring visitors know they can follow the resident out of the building. 
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Site Plan 
 
Figure 1 Site Plan 
AA = Assembly Area 
IAA = Inclement Weather Assembly Area 
              = Fire Hydrant 
             = FDC 
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Emergency Evacuation Routes  
 
Figure 2 Basement Egress 
       = Pull Station 
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Figure 3 "D" Wing Egress 1st Floor 
 
       = Pull Station 
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Figure 4 First Floor Egress 
       = Pull Station 
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Figure 5 Second Floor Egress 
       = Pull Station 
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Fire Hazards  
The fire hazards in the facility are generally consistent with business occupancies and those in 
physical laboratories with the possible exceptions of those outlined in this section. 
Some building areas have accumulated a considerable number of combustible and flammable 
liquids containers with relatively small quantities of liquids.  The vast majority of these 
containers are stored in flammable liquids cabinets.  All uses of the combustible and flammable 
liquids appear to be incidental to the primary function of the areas located. 
Because the liquids are properly stored, their use is incidental, and their quantities are relatively 
low, the hazard is expected to be controlled by the fire sprinkler system, as installed. 
Lasers are used within the facility and do add an additional ignition hazard, however the 
configurations of the lasers and laser use procedures reduce these risks to an acceptable level. 
The commercial kitchen is a hazard to the building and occupants as it contains deep fryer and 
gas fire grills and ovens. These hazards have been properly addressed with a compliant 
suppression system designed specifically for these hazards. 
Utility hazards associated with this facility are electrical and natural gas.  
Natural gas enters the facility on the eastern side, directly adjacent to Room D104 and enters the 
“C” wing through the basement level of the C-Wing stairwell.  It is metered, pressure regulated, 
and then dispersed to the boilers, hot water heaters, and four areas in “D” Wing.  The “C” Wing 
gas line feeds the boilers, hot water heaters and areas in the “C” Wing. 
The facility receives power from the LANL grid at 13.2kV.  There is a large transformer in the 
basement, Room C10 that steps this power down to 480V (3 Phase) for distribution throughout 
the facility.  There are small electrical control closets dispersed throughout the facility and easily 
accessible to the main corridors. 
The large transformer in the basement could pose a significant threat to the fire safety of the 
building.  Oil-cooled transformer fires are relatively common and occasionally catastrophic.  For 
this reason oil-cooled transformers are seldom installed inside buildings.  On the positive, the oil 
(PCB Contaminated) originally used for cooling has been replaced by a less flammable fluid.   
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Performance-Based Analysis 
 
The performance based guide by SFPE was used for the analysis of Building 1. The process is as 
follows: 
Defining Project Scope 
Identifying Goals 
Defining Stakeholder Objectives 
Developing Performance Criteria 
Developing Design Fire Scenarios 
Developing Trial Designs (Not completed. Evaluating an existing Structure) 
Evaluating Existing Design against Performance Criteria. (7) 
 
Defining Project Scope 
The scope of this project is to evaluate the tenability and structural response of Building 1 during 
likely fire scenarios. Two types of modeling software will be used for this analysis. The first 
model will analyze the egress system of Building 1 to help determine the available safe egress 
time for Building 1, with the second model analyzing the effects of fire on Building 1 structural 
components and the egress system. 
The hope of this analysis is to show that Building 1 in its current configuration will meet the 
goals of the Department of Energy (DOE) with regards to life safety and structural fire 
resistance. If all goals are achieved for this business occupancy with the use of the 
aforementioned modeling software then DOE can be relatively assured that the operations 
housed in Building 1 for Los Alamos National Laboratory will not be greatly affected.     
Identifying Goals and Defining Stakeholder Objectives 
Building 1 is predominately a business occupancy with some incidental assembly occupancy 
space. Building 1 does not house any mission critical processes, hazardous materials, or high 
value equipment that require extra protection from fire that would require special analysis to 
evaluate the effectiveness of current fire protection features. The effect of a fire in Building 1 is 
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believed to only impact personnel who currently have office space inside Building 1, as well as 
some incidental lab space and meeting space.  
Building 1 is divided into 4 wings and it is further believed that a fire in one wing is not likely to 
have an effect on all four wings. A single fire would at most damage two adjacent wings.  The 
configuration of Building 1 in effect reduces the likelihood of a total loss fire. Using these 
assumptions it is reasonable to assume that wings not close to a fire would be able to be 
operational with limited interruption. The wings that are affected by the fire would likely have 
limited damage and not be a total loss. 
With the previous assumptions and the configuration of Building 1 it is likely that the down time 
for mission operations would be limited to personnel relocations or small lab space until the 
damaged portions of Building 1 could be repaired barring any structural fire damage. This limits 
the goals of this analysis to life safety and the prevention of structural damage to Building 1. 
The life safety goal will be as found in Chapter 5 of NFPA® 101 Life Safety Code®. 
“5.2.2 Performance Criterion. Any occupant who is no intimate with the 
ignition shall not be exposed to instantaneous or cumulative untenable 
conditions.” (1) 
The goal for Structural damage is to prevent flashover conditions for the likely fire scenarios that 
can be found in Building 1. 
The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering states that flashover is associated with 
compartment temperatures of 500˚C to 600˚C (8). 
 
Developing Performance Criteria 
The performance criteria for preventing structural damage is preventing temperatures from 
reaching 600˚C. At these temperatures the light weight concrete used in the construction of 
Building 1 loses roughly about 50% of its strength (8). Likewise the steel joists used in Building 
1 also lose 50% of their strength at around 600˚C (8).  
The performance criteria for Life Safety will be based on occupant’s ability to find their way to 
an exit. The limit for this has been determined for a large enclosure where the occupants may not 
be familiar with the building at a visibility of at least 13 meters (8).    
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Figure 6 Table 2-4.2 from SFPE Handbook Third Edition 
A quick internet search of average height of males in the United States showed several sites that 
indicate that height to be 5 feet 9 inches. With this height in mind a 6 foot height or 2 meters 
above the finished floor seems like a reasonable distance at which to hold the 13 meter visibility 
distance. 
Building 1’s construction and current configuration will be found acceptable if during all of the 
likely fire scenarios modeled, the visibility within the egress system stays at or above 13 meters 
at a height of 2 meters above the finished floor for the required amount of time needed for safe 
egress as determined by the egress model and if flashover conditions are never attained during 
the fire event.  
Developing Design Fire Scenarios 
 A survey of approximately 10 websites for the most common causes of fire in business 
occupancies resulted in the following list. 
Table 10 Common Causes for Business Fires 
Cause Number of times found in search 
 
Open Flames 1 
Electrical 5 
Cooking 1 
Spontaneous Ignition 1 
Flammable and Combustible Materials 1 
Human Error 3 
Arson 5 
Smoking 2 
Hot Work 1 
 
Open flames does not seem like a likely cause for a fire in Building 1 due to the restriction of the 
use of candles by the laboratory. One might assume that because Building 1 houses some lab 
space that open flames might be a factor, however Building 1’s labs our electronics labs with no 
need for open flames plus most of the labs in Building 1 are no longer routinely used. 
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Electrical fires were one of the most mentioned and seem like a likely cause for ignition in 
Building 1. One of the design fires will incorporate this cause into its scenario. 
Cooking as a cause did not have huge support from the websites visited, but Building 1 does 
have a small commercial kitchen and although the hazards within the cafeteria are properly 
addressed a kitchen fire is not out of the realm of possibility. For this reason a scenario will be 
developed with cooking as the cause of ignition. 
Spontaneous ignition such as oily rags not properly disposed of is not a likely fire scenario for 
Building 1 and will not be evaluated. This type of fire lends itself more to an industrial 
occupancy as opposed to the office space that is Building 1.  
Flammable and combustible materials are a plausible fire cause for Building 1 and will be a part 
of a design fire scenario. 
Human error is a plausible fire cause for Building 1 and will be a part of a design fire scenario. 
Arson was one of the most popular causes of fire in businesses, however Building 1 is located 
behind a guarded perimeter where access is only available by way of badge access or security 
guard. There is no business competition that would drive arson for hire. The likelihood of a 
disgruntled employee starting a fire is less due to the access restrictions. For these reasons arson 
will not be evaluated in a design fire scenario.  
Smoking as a cause seems like a plausible fire cause but due to it being heavily restricted and 
enforced on laboratory property it most likely is less of an issue than in other areas. 
Hot work does seem as though it would have a high likelihood as a cause for fire in Building 1, 
but due to the age of the building and its components it is likely that some refurbishment may 
need to be done in the mechanical areas of the basement resulting in hot work. Hot work will be 
a component of a design fire scenario.  
Design Fires 
Because the assumption is that a fire in one wing of Building 1 will not involve all of the wings 
of Building 1. One design fire for each wing and one for the basement were developed using the 
common causes of fire for businesses discussed earlier. Another assumption made was that all 
fires happen in occupied areas, therefore it is assumed that notification is made by pull station 
almost immediately upon the onset of the fire. 
Basement Fire 
The design fire that was developed for the basement is based on inspection and the potential for 
such a scenario to happen. In the basement of “C” wing by the west stairway there is a small 
room created with low walls approximately 7 feet high. Within this space a 3 foot high stack of 
flattened corrugated cardboard was found. Also above this space is duct work for the HVAC 
system for Building 1. 
40 
 
Brett Noakes 
June 2015 
The scenario developed is that due to the age of the building and nature of the basement being a 
mechanical area an upgrade to the duct work is needed in the area defined above. This work will 
require some hot work and while procedures and inspections of the area are required before work 
begins human error gets involved and not all the hot work precautions are followed which can 
lead to the ignition of the 3 foot high stack of corrugated cardboard. 
The location of this fire will challenge the egress system from the basement as well as have the 
potential to challenge the egress from the first floor. Additional assumptions for this scenario are 
that the normally closed door at the top of the stairs is open throughout the duration of the fire 
making this a true worst case incident.   
Wing “D” Fire 
The wing “D” fire scenario involves the use of flammable liquids in a laboratory setting. This 
fire will have a liter of ethanol pool fire. This is the likely scenario that a wash bottle of ethanol 
with an unsecured lid is knocked over on a lab bench and the contents come in contact with hot 
equipment in the area igniting the pool of ethanol. This fire will be located in an area that will 
challenge a major intersection in the Wing “D” egress system and will assume a worst case of 
the doors to the fire room being open and staying open throughout the fire.   
Wing “C” Fire 
The wing “C” fire scenario involves the careless placement of a winter coat in close proximity to 
a space heater. This fire will represent the more human error but this time in an office setting. 
This fire will be located in an area that will challenge an intersection in the Wing “C” egress 
system and will assume a worst case of the doors to the fire room being open and staying open 
throughout the fire.   
Wing “B” Fire 
The wing “B” fire will be a kitchen fire located in the cafeteria. This scenario encompasses the 
largest hazard associated with Wing “B”. This fire will have both the sprinkler system 
operational and the wet chemical suppression system operational to show if the hazards are 
properly addressed. The fire will be a deep fat fryer fire. 
Wing A/B Fire 
The Wing “A/B” fire will be a wastebasket fire in an office setting. The office will be located on 
the first floor near the east exit and east stairwell. Again all doors will be open to represent the 
worst case conditions. A fire in this area has the potential to completely render half the egress 
system for Wing “A/B”. 
This fire will represent an overloaded electrical outlet located next to a small recycle waste paper 
basket.  
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Analysis 
 
Models 
FDS is the fire and smoke modeling software that will be used for the following analysis. FDS 
was developed at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (9). “FDS simulates 
fire scenarios using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) optimized for low-speed, thermally 
driven flow” (9). For this analysis PyroSim was used as an interface with FDS to build the 
models and fire scenarios. PyroSim is a graphical user interface for FDS (9). This interface 
provides immediate input feedback and ensures that the FDS input file used is correct (9). 
PyroSim was used to build and run the fire scenarios described above. This software allowed 
quick feedback on the developed scenario to make sure that the model was set up correctly based 
on the inputs through PyroSim. This function was very helpful in identifying areas within the 
model that needed attention. 
Pathfinder was used for the calculation of total amount of time it takes all of the occupants of 
Building 1 to exit the building, also known as the required safe egress time. “Pathfinder is an 
agent passed egress and human movement simulator” (10) . Pathfinder was very helpful in 
showing visually what the previous egress calculations showed. Pathfinder shows a visual 
representation of the egress process during an egress event based on the imported parameters, 
both human and building. 
Egress Model 
A Pathfinder model was developed for Building 1 using drawing files. Each floor was drawn per 
its floor arrangement with all egress components built to connect the floors and exterior exits 
from Building 1.   The Pathfinder model will show a visual representation of occupants before 
and during the building evacuation event. The only parameters were that occupants were to use 
the nearest available exit and were to start the exit process immediately. After the total time for 
all the occupants to exit had been calculated the pre-movement time discussed earlier was added 
to the model’s time to make the total required safe egress time (RSET). This time will determine 
the length of time needed to run each fire scenario. 
As stated before the likely occupant load for Building 1 with the lecture hall full is 1703 
occupants. This was the number of occupants placed in the Pathfinder model with the 
aforementioned parameters. The Pathfinder model showed a total egress time of 144.3 seconds 
or roughly 2.5 minutes. The pre-movement time stated earlier as worst case was 3 minutes, when 
the 3 minute pre-movement time is added to the model’s 2.5 minute required egress time the 
total RSET for Building 1 is 5.5 minutes. This 5.5 minutes will be the bounding time each of the 
fire scenarios will be evaluated against to determine if there is enough available safe egress time 
(ASET). 
42 
 
Brett Noakes 
June 2015 
 
Figure 7 Pathfinder model at the beginning of egress simulation. 
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Figure 8 Screen shot of Pathfinder model showing all three levels of Building 1. 
 
 
Figure 9 Pathfinder model showing all occupants have exited. 
Fire Analysis 
Basement Fire Scenario 
The FDS model was built using PyroSim software with imported floor plans. The general layout 
of the fire area was constructed using the imported floor plan. All model meshes were set at .5 
meters cubed. The use of smaller meshes was not feasible as using them made two computers 
crash.   
Model parameters: 
Room heights for this scenario where set at 14 feet for the basement area and 10 feet for the first 
floor corridor. Only the corridor for the first floor was constructed while the basement was 
constructed as a large open area aside from the room of origin. The majority of the basement area 
is partitioned with low walls; because of this construction, the smoke movement is assumed to 
accumulate undeterred like an open room. 
The fire parameters for this model were developed using information found in the SFPA 
Handbook. The fuel package for this model will be a stack of corrugated cardboard boxes. The 
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fuel package for this fire was at a height of 1 meter or about three feet in height; however the 
only data that could be found in the SFPA Handbook was for whole pallets or large stacks of like 
materials, for this reason some assumptions were made based on the data that was found in the 
SFPA Handbook.  
 
Figure 10 Photo of Similar Fuel Package from Dreamstime.com 
 
SFPE Data: 
 
Figure 11 Table 3-1.5 HRR Values of Palletized and Rack Storage Commodities Tested at 
FMRC for SFPE Handbook Third Edition 
 
The data shows a peak Heat Release Rate (HRR) of 2,470 kw/m2 for a 4.5 meter high stack of 
empty cardboard. The fuel package in this scenario is 1 meter as found, so dividing the peak 
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HRR by four reduces the HRR to 617 kw/m2 which is what was used in the model. It is 
understood that a linear relationship between height and HRR does not exist but it is safe to 
assume that less fuel will produce a smaller peak HRR. 
The next step was to find a HRR curve that for a similar type of fuel. One was found in Figure 
3.1.42 of the SFPE Handbook Fourth edition. Using the SCEA std, Curve which had a peak of 
about the same 2400 kW all that was needed was to adjust the curve to the time constraints set by 
the scenario. The SCEA curve reached its peak at 600 seconds however its HRR was at 0 at the 
500 second mark so the model started basically at the 500 second mark. 
Table 11 Model HRR Inputs for Fire Growth 
Time (seconds) Fraction of Peak HRR 
25 10% 
50 20% 
100 100% 
150 70% 
200 50% 
250 20% 
300 10% 
 
The room of origin is protected by two 212°F (100°C) sprinkler heads. These were placed as 
appropriate in the model. 
The use of the model is to show the tenability of the area and the temperature of the room of 
origin so slice files were used to see the effects of the fire on the area. One temperature slice file 
was used in the middle of the room of origin to see if the 600°C threshold was exceeded. Two 
visual slice files were used to evaluate the distance one would expect to be able to see during the 
fire event for the duration of the RSET time of 5.5 minutes. These were placed 6 feet above the 
floor on both the basement level and the first floor.  
 
The figure below shows the highest temperatures attained in the room were at 270°C, well below 
the 600 degree threshold. The highest temperatures were achieved during the peak HRR. 
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Figure 12 Highest Temperatures for Basement Scenario 
 
The output files for this model show a sprinkler activation time of 54 seconds for the first 
sprinkler and 60 a second activation time for the second sprinkler in the room. 
The visual distance one could be expected to see is demonstrated in the following figures. As one 
can see the basement did not meet the criteria of maintaining the 13 meters of visual distance as 
the visual distance of the basement dropped below 13 meters at around 240 seconds. The first 
floor corridor however never dropped below 15 meters throughout the analysis.  
It could be argued that it is not likely for guests to be in the basement area of Building 1 and 
therefore the criteria of a 4 meter visual distance could be the threshold to consider. If this 
criterion were applied the basement level would have passed this analysis. For the purposes of 
this report it was determined that the basement level fire did not meet the performance criteria set 
by the stake holders and therefore additional steps need to be taken to remedy this scenario. 
Those steps would be to remove the fuel package from the basement to limit the fuel load in this 
area. 
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Figure 13 Basement Visual Distance at 6 feet 
 
 
Figure 14 First Floor Visual Distance at 6 feet 
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Wing “D” Fire Scenario 
The FDS model was built using PyroSim software with imported floor plans. The general layout 
of the fire area was constructed using the imported floor plan.  
Model Parameters: 
Room heights for this scenario where set at 9 feet for the whole area. Only the corridor for the 
first floor was constructed and the room of origin. As stated in the scenario doors to the room are 
open throughout the fire. 
 
The fire parameters where developed using a series of calculations found in the SFPE Handbook 
on flammable liquid spill fires. 
First estimate the size of the spill. 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  = (1.4𝑚𝑚2 /𝐿𝐿)V 
V = 1L 
As=1.4m2 
Second estimate the maximum possible fire size. 
A=1.55*As 
As= 1.4 
A=2.17m2 
Third calculate the heat release rate of Ethanol. 
?̇?𝑄=𝑚𝑚"̇ *A*∆hc 
𝑚𝑚"̇ =.022kg/m2 s form page 3-38 of the SFPE Handbook (8) for Diameters of greater that .6m but 
less than 3.0m 
D=1 
A=2.17m2 
∆hc= 26.8MJ/kg from table 3-1.21 in the SFPE Handbook (8) for Ethanol 
?̇?𝑄=1.27 MW 
Fourth calculate the total burn time of the fire. 
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tb= (V*ρ)/(𝑚𝑚"̇ *A) 
V=1L (1L=.001m3)  
ρ= 794kg/m3 from table 3-1.21 in the SFPE Handbook (8) for Ethanol 
A=2.17m2 
tb = 17 seconds total burn time 
 
From the above calculations the fire designed in the PyroSim has a peak HRR of 1270kw/m2. It 
is also assumed that once ignited the pool fire will be at peak HRR for the duration of the fire 
with no ramp up. The fire will burn for 17 seconds and then extinguish once the fuel is 
consumed. 
The room of origin is protected by six 100°C heads that were placed in the model appropriately. 
The room selected in the structure is located at the intersection of the two main corridors for 
Wing “D”.  
The use of the model is to show the tenability of the area and the temperature of the room of 
origin so slice files were used to see the effects of the fire on the area. One temperature slice file 
was used in the middle of the room of origin to see if the 600°C threshold was exceeded. One 
visual slice file was used to evaluate the distance one would expect to be able to see during the 
fire event for the duration of the RSET time of 5.5 minutes, it was placed 6 feet above the floor. 
The rendering seen below shows that the highest temperature in the room was 111°C far below 
the 600°C threshold. 
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Figure 15 Temperature Slice for the Wind D fire 
  
The rendering below shows that the visibility at 6 feet above the finished floor was only limited 
to 22.5 meters which is above the 13 meter threshold. 
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Figure 16 Visual Slice of the D Wing Fire at 6 Feet 
The output files of the model show the first sprinkler discharge was 2 seconds into the event 
ultimately all sprinklers in the room activated. 
The model shows that for this type of fire scenario Building 1’s current configuration is 
acceptable. 
 
Wing “C” Fire Scenario 
The FDS model was built using PyroSim software with imported floor plans. The general layout 
of the fire area was constructed using the imported floor plan.  
Model Parameters 
Room heights for this scenario were set at 9 feet for the whole area. Only the corridor for the first 
floor was constructed and the room of origin. As stated in the scenario doors to the room are 
open throughout the fire. 
The HRR curve that was used for this model simulated two jackets that have ignited by a nearby 
space heater is an office located in Wing “C”. The office like the previous scenario is located at a 
major corridor junction in Wing “C”. 
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Figure 17 HRR Curve of Two men's Jackets from SFPE Handbook Third Edition 
The curve modeled was for the Polyester Jackets to show a worst case scenario. Below is the 
data that was input in the model to control the fire growth.  
 
Table 12 HRR Inputs for the Wing C Fire 
Time (seconds) Fraction of Peak HRR 
0 0% 
100 10% 
175 75% 
200 100% 
250 60% 
300 40% 
350 10% 
 
The rendering below shows that the room temperature of the Wing “C” fire only reached a 
temperature of 85°C again far below the 600°C threshold. The model output files show sprinkler 
activation at 173 seconds. Only one of the two sprinkler heads located in the room activated. 
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Figure 18 Temperature Slice of the Wing C Fire 
The rendering below shows the visibility at 6 feet above the floor. As shown the visibility drops 
to 11.5 meters which is below the threshold set for this analysis. The argument can be made that 
if the 13 meter requirement is not maintained that it would cause persons unfamiliar with the 
building to turn and go another way. The way the egress system is set up in Building 1 it would 
allow individuals safe egress away or around the high concentration of smoke for the area 
located at the end of the corridor. 
 
Figure 19 Visual Slice of the Wing C Fire at 6 feet. 
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For the purposes of the analysis based on the limited experience of the evaluator with this 
modeling software this scenario should have additional modeling completed to further eliminate 
any errors that may have reduced the visibility.  
 Wing “B” Fire Scenario 
The FDS model was built using PyroSim software with imported floor plans. The general layout 
of the fire area was constructed using the imported floor plan.  
Model Parameters  
Room heights for this scenario where set at 9 feet for the whole area. Only the corridor for the 
first floor was constructed and the room of origin and the main entrance area. As stated in the 
scenario doors to the room are open throughout the fire. 
Online research was conducted to find appropriate data to import into the model for the design 
fire. During this research a draft paper was found by W.K Chow and Xiaomin Ni of China titled 
Experimental Evaluation of Performance of Open Kitchen Fire Suppression Systems (11). The 
report explains a series of experiments using a 25 cm pan with cooking oil heated electrically to 
its autoignition temperature. In some tests the oil was allowed to free burn and in others the 
effect of extinguishment were evaluated. One such experiment showed the effect of a dry 
chemical extinguishing agent being applied to the cooking oil fire. Below is the graph of those 
tests. 
 
Figure 20 Screen Shot of the HRR Curves Measured During the Experiments with Dry 
Powder Extinguishment (11) 
The report stated that after the initial extinguisher discharge there was a brief flare up and rise in 
the HRR after the discharge of the extinguishing agent but then the fire quickly extinguished 
(11). The SDP-1 curve is the one used to design the fire for this scenario.  
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The SDP-1 test shows a peak HRR of 100 kW for a 25cm pan. The fryer that is located in the 
kitchen of Wing “B” is approximately 14” X 14” (35.5 cm X 35.5cm) and has a larger surface 
area than the pan used in the experiments noted in the report. The surface area of the 
experimental pan was calculated to be 491 cm2, while the surface area of the fryer is 1260 cm2 
roughly 2.5 times larger. Using the equation ?̇?𝑄=𝑚𝑚"̇ *A*∆hc with all other things being equal the 
only change between the experiment and the scenario application are the surface areas of the oil. 
For this reason the average HRR of 33.2kW was multiplied by 2.5 to arrive at a new HRR for the 
scenario of 83 kW. After the discharge of the extinguisher in the experiment the HRR rose to 100 
kW or 300% increase before extinguishment. For this reason the 83kW was multiplied by three 
to arrive at a new peak HRR of 249 kW. 
The curves with the adjustment of increased surface area include the extinguishment by way of 
dry chemical which is similar to the extinguishment installed in the hood of kitchen of Wing 
“B”. By using this curve I am also modeling the application of the installed extinguishment 
system. The model will however have the installed sprinklers for the area around the hood 
system. 
The table below shows the inputs in the model for the fire in the Wing “B” café. 
 
Table 13 HRR Inputs for the Wing B Fire 
Time (seconds) Fraction of Peak HRR 
10 10% 
100 20% 
150 40% 
175 30% 
200 100% 
220 10% 
300 0% 
 
The rendering below shows that the room temperature of the Wing “B” fire only reached a 
temperature of 55°C again far below the 600°C threshold. The model output files show sprinkler 
activation at 198 seconds. Only one sprinkler in the room activated. 
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Figure 21 Temperature Slice File for Wing B fire 
  
The rendering below shows the visibility at 6 feet above the floor. As shown the visibility drops 
to 15 meters which is above the threshold set for this analysis and therefore this scenario is found 
to be properly addressed with Building 1’s current configuration.  
 
 
Figure 22 Visual Slice at 6 feet for Wing B Fire 
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Wing “A/B” Fire Scenario 
The FDS model was built using PyroSim software with imported floor plans. The general layout 
of the fire area was constructed using the imported floor plan.  
Model Parameters  
Room heights for this scenario where set at 9 feet for the whole area. Only the corridor for the 
first floor was constructed and the room of origin and the main entrance area.  The stairwell to 
the second floor of Wing “A” was included as well as the second floor corridors to evaluate the 
visibility at the 6 foot levels on both floors. As stated in the scenario doors to the room are open 
throughout the fire. 
The HRR curve was used for this model to simulate a trash fire that was ignited by an overloaded 
electrical outlet in the reception area of the main entrance of Wings “B” and “A”. The purpose of 
this fire was to see how a likely fire scenario at a junction of two adjacent wings would affect 
occupants on two floors as well as in the area of the auditorium.  
The below HRR curve from the SFPE Handbook was used for the design of the fire for this 
scenario. The curve input into the model is the Three Sacks curve that has a peak of 350 kW at 
75 seconds. This was the peak HRR used during this scenario. 
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Figure 23 HRR Curve for Trash Bags from SFPE Handbook Third Edition. 
 
 
 
Below is the model inputs used to build the fire growth for this scenario. 
Table 14 HRR Inputs for Wing A/B Fire 
Time (seconds) Fraction of Peak HRR 
0 0% 
25 20% 
50 70% 
100 100% 
125 90% 
150 75% 
200 50% 
250 30% 
300 10% 
 
The rendering below shows that the room temperature of the Wing “A/B” fire only reached a 
temperature of 120°C again far below the 600°C threshold. The model output files show 
sprinkler activation at 56 seconds. Only two sprinklers activated during this scenario fire model. 
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Figure 24 Temperature Slice for the Wing A/B Fire 
 
The rendering below shows the visibility at 6 feet above the floor for the first floor. As shown 
the visibility drops to 11 meters which is below the threshold set for this analysis and therefore 
this scenario is found to be improperly addressed with Building 1’s current configuration.  
 
Figure 25 Visual Slice at 6 Feet for the First Floor of wing A/B 
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The rendering below shows the visibility at 6 feet above the floor for the second floor of Wing 
“A”. As shown the visibility drops to 11.5 meters which is below the threshold set for this 
analysis and therefore this scenario is found to be improperly addressed with Building 1’s current 
configuration.  
 
 
Figure 26  Visual Slice at 6 Feet for the Second Floor of Wing A 
The visibility for this scenario is still well above the threshold for those occupants that are 
familiar with the building but this scenario is in the area where Building 1 is most likely to have 
guests. In fact guests are instructed to report to the very reception area in this scenario. For this 
reason combustibles in this area should be kept to a minimum. Again this scenario is using a 
worst case scenario of three bags of trash which could be argued the likelihood of which is small 
but if janitorial services are not available the three bags of trash could happen. More modeling 
could be done by a more experienced evaluator to better create the area for this scenario. The 
more simple solution could be to remove the reception area from this area or add more restrictive 
administrative controls. 
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Conclusion 
 
This analysis of Building 1 has shown that the 1971 vintage building does meet current building 
codes. This analysis also used modern fire modeling techniques to model likely fire scenarios for 
each wing to see if Building 1’s current configuration could perform to the stated criteria. The 
models showed that Building 1’s current configuration is acceptable on the basis of structural fire 
protection as temperatures during the fire models stayed well below flashpoint which was one 
part of the criteria. The models also showed, however, that the smoke visibility levels could not 
be maintained to the more restrictive unfamiliar occupant distance of 13 meters. In a few of the 
models the visual distance dropped below the criteria; however all models would have passed the 
less restrictive familiar occupant distance of 4 meters. Additional modeling could be completed 
by a more experienced evaluator to determine the relevancy of this analysis.   
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Suppression System Drawings 
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Fire Alarm Drawings 
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DETACT Models 
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Smoke Detectors 
 
 
Sprinklers
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Alarm Device Cut Sheets 
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Floor Plans with Exits 
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Occupancy Identification Maps 
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